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Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled
Commercial Speech
and the First Amendment
Nicole B. Cdsarez*
I. INTRODUCTION
Advertising has always presented a conundrum in First Amendment
analysis. As a business activity, advertising should be regulable by the state
subject only to substantive due process review.' On the other hand, advertising
is also a form of expression that raises important questions regarding freedom
of speech.2
Sixty years ago, the Supreme Court considered advertising as nothing more
than one aspect of commerce. Advertising restrictions were seen as economic
regulations that did not involve First Amendment issues In the 1970s,
however, the Court began referring to advertising as "commercial speech"4 and
recognized that it was not "wholly outside the protection of the First
* Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas, Houston, Texas. University of
Texas, B.J. 1976, J.D. 1979; University of Houston, M.A. 1991. I would like to thank
Professors Sandra Guerra and Peter Linzer at the University of Houston Law Center for
reviewing earlier drafts of this Article, and Rueben Cfisarez for all his help and insight.
1. Since the Supreme Court's retreat from the laissez-faire economic philosophy
epitomized by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), economic regulation need only
be reasonably related to a legitimate state objective and not arbitrary or discriminatory
to fulfill the demands of substantive due process. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 396 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage law); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (sustaining statute that fixed a maximum price for milk).
2. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976) (providing First Amendment protection to
licensed pharmacists who advertised prescription drug prices); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (invalidating application of state libel law to civil
rights organization's advertisement).
3. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949)
(sustaining city advertising prohibition pursuant to economic substantive due process
review); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding commercial
handbill ordinance as proper government regulation of business).
4. The Supreme Court first used the phrase "commercial speech" in Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973).
According to Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, District of Columbia Circuit Judge
Skelly Wright originated the expression in 1971. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The
Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 756 (1993)
[hereinafter Konzinski & Banner, The Anti-History]. See Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 658 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
1
Casarez: Casarez: Don't Tell Me What to Say:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURILAW REVIEW
Amendment. '' 5 At least since the Court's landmark decision in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,6 laws
restricting or prohibiting advertising have been subject to an intermediate level
of First Amendment scrutiny.7 After the rulings in City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Networks and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,9 commentators
agreed that the Court seemed to be expanding First Amendment protections for
commercial speech.'0
However, the Court's recent decision in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc." shows that the Court's economic approach to advertising still
exists, at least in the context of compelled commercial speech. In that case,
federal marketing orders required that California fruit producers pay an annual
assessment to fund a generic advertising program.' The producers objected,
claiming that the orders abridged their First Amendment right to be free from
compelled speech. 3 By a five-to-four vote, the Court upheld the marketing
orders, characterizing them as no more than economic regulations that neither
implicated nor violated the First Amendment.
4
The Court's failure to apply any First Amendment analysis in Glickman
stands in stark contrast to its other compelled speech cases. So-called "negative
free speech rights"' 5 are well-established in the religious and political context.
5. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
6. Id. at 748.
7. See id. at 771 n.24.
8. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
9. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
10. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640 (1996) (stating
that "like treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech is an idea whose time has
evidently arrived," although questioning the wisdom of equal protection); Martin H.
Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech Distinction:
The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 555 (1997) (opining that
the Court in Liquormart "appeared to reject the 'step child' status of commercial speech
in everything but name"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free
.Speech: The Implications of44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 123, 126 (stating that
"[a]fter 44 Liquormart, it is unclear why 'commercial speech' should continue to be
treated as a separate category of speech isolated from general First Amendment
principles"); Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech
Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 681, 686 (1997) (noting that a majority of Supreme Court Justices appear ready
to apply strict scrutiny review to some forms of commercial speech).
11. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
12. Id. at 2134.
13. Id. at2139.
14. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens characterized the orders as presenting
a "question of business judgment" rather than a "constitutional issue." Id. at 2142.
15. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 26 (1986)
[Vol. 63
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A child cannot be forced to recite the pledge of allegiance, 6 a newspaper cannot
be made to provide free reply space to political candidates,' 7 and non-union
employees cannot be required to pay for a union's ideological activities. 8 These
examples are seen as abridging the First Amendment right of citizens to remain
silent.
Granted, compelled commercial speech presents its own set of difficulties.
Traditionally, the remedy for speech-related harms is said to be more speech,
rather than enforced silence.' 9 Disclosure requirements are seen as one of the
less restrictive commercial speech regulations because they add to the flow of
commercial information. 0 If compelled commercial speech is given the same
First Amendment scrutiny as forced ideological speech, the fear is that the
government will be unable to mandate disclosure requirements to prevent fraud,
deception, or other commercial harms.2'
The generic advertising campaign required in Glickman was not designed
to remedy any of these threats to the marketplace. While some commentators
have argued that the Glickman decision is unimportant because of its narrow
facts,' the case evidences the Supreme Court's apparent confusion in resolving
compelled commercial speech cases. If commercial speech is worthy of First
Amendment protection-and recent Supreme Court cases have strengthened this
notion-then regulations that compel or restrict commercial speech cannot be
dismissed as mere economic regulation. Even those disclosure requirements that
are meant to protect consumers from misleading advertising or overly aggressive
sales practices involve speech, just as defamatory statements still qualify as
expression. While libelous remarks may not always be protected by the
Constitution, neither are libel cases decided without reference to the First
Amendment.
(Rebnquist, C.., dissenting).
16. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
17. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974).
18. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,234 (1977).
19. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977) (stating that the
preferred remedy in lawyer advertising cases was "more disclosure, rather than less").
20. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985).
21. See Caren Schmulen Sweetland, Note, The Demise of a Workable Commercial
Speech Doctrine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial
Disclosure Requirements, 76 TEX. L. REv. 471, 477 (1997) (stating that subjecting
commercial disclosure requirements to First Amendment scrutiny would endanger
consumer protection laws). But see Sullivan, supra note 10, at 160 (concluding that
granting commercial speech full First Amendment protection would not mean the end of
consumer protection agencies).
22. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, Court's View of Wileman as Economic Issue May
Help Commercial Speech in Long Run (visited June 13, 1998) <http:/l
www.mediainst.org/digest97fall/wileman.html>.
23. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
1998]
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This Article argues that the Glickman Court erred in treating compelled
commercial speech as a mere question of economic policy. Part II reviews the
development of the commercial speech doctrine and identifies consumer
protection as the underlying rationale for commercial speech regulation. Part III
focuses on compelled speech, including disclosure requirements, and argues that
commercial speech should be compelled or restricted only to prevent consumer
deception and overreaching in the marketplace. Governmental attempts to
compel commercial speech for any other purpose, such as the mandatory
advertising scheme in Glickman, should be upheld only pursuant to strict
scrutiny analysis. Part IV examines the Glickman decision, showing how the
Court used contextual factors to ignore First Amendment principles, and in the
process, returned to an economic view of commercial speech that it discredited
more than thirty years ago. Finally, Part V of this Article takes the position that
even when the state compels commercial disclosures in the name of consumer
protection, it implicates speech interests. Therefore, those enactments should be
subject to an intermediate level of First Amendment review.
II. RIDING THE SEE SAW: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Advertising's voyage from outside to inside the sphere of First Amendment
coverage has not been an altogether smooth one. Along the way, the Supreme
Court has struggled to formulate a coherent rationale for whether, why, and how
commercial speech figures into our system of freedom of expression. The Court
granted commercial speech a significant amount of First Amendment protection
in the mid-1970s, only to reduce that coverage in later cases. More recently, the
Court has been inching back to its earlier view that advertising should be more
regulable than fully protected speech only as necessary to preserve fair-dealing
in the marketplace.
A. From Father Knows Best to Anti-Paternalism: The Early Cases
When the Supreme Court first addressed the state's ability to regulate
advertising, it treated advertising as commerce rather than speech.2 The Court's
unanimous 1942 decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen25 was regarded as the
prevailing judicial precedent in this area for more than thirty years. In
Chrestensen, the Court simply announced that advertising was not protected by
(holding that First Amendment requires defamatory statements be made with knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth for public officials to recover for libel).
24. For a thorough account of how the business/speech dichotomy influenced the
commercial speech doctrine's development, see Kozinski & Banner, The Anti-History,
supra note 4.
25. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
[Vol. 63
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the First Amendment to uphold a New York ordinance forbidding street
distribution of commercial handbills.26 According to the Court, whether
individuals should be allowed to promote their businesses through handbill
advertising was merely a matter of "legislative judgment." 27
In 1976, when the Court examined the nature and value of commercial
speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,28 it overruled the Chrestensen approach as overly simplistic. In
that case, the Court invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, a Virginia statute
that forbade licensed pharmacists to advertise prescription drug prices.2 The
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, rejected the notion that
commercial speech was less deserving of First Amendment protection than other
speech.30 Defining commercial speech as speech that does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction,"'31 the Court found that advertisers, consumers
and society all benefit from the "free flow of commercial information." 32
Commercial speech is "indispensable" to ensure both that consumers make
informed marketplace decisions, and that citizens make intelligent political
choices regarding the operation of our free market system.33
In its defense, the State argued that the price ban protected consumers
from placing too much importance on drug prices when choosing a pharmacist.34
The Court discounted this justification as a "highly paternalistic"'35 example of
the State trying to influence behavior by suppressing truthful information about
lawful products. The Court stated that citizens must be allowed to make up their
own minds and that the State must accept that "information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them. 36
Although the Court treated truthful commercial information about a lawful
product as fully protected speech, it also stressed that the government must be
able to ensure "that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well
26. Id. at 54. Without citing any authority, the Court said "[w]e are ... clear that
the Constitution imposes no ... restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising." Id.
27. Id.
28. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
29. Id. at 773.
30. Id. at 770.
31. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
32. Id. at 762-64.
33. Id. at 765.
34. Id. at 767-68.




Casarez: Casarez: Don't Tell Me What to Say:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
as freely. '37 According to the Court, "commonsense differences" '3 between
commercial and other forms of speech justify a lesser degree of First
Amendment coverage for the former to enable the government to regulate false
and misleading advertising. First, the Court described commercial speech as
more easily verifiable by the speaker than news or political speech, making it
reasonable for the State to require truthful advertising.39 Second, the Court said
commercial speech was more durable than other kinds of speech,4" and therefore
less likely to be discouraged by "proper regulation."' Taken together, these two
characteristics not only allow the government to insist on accuracy in
advertising, but also to demand "such additional information, warnings, and
disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent [advertising from] being deceptive. 4 2
Of course, the drug prices at issue in Virginia Pharmacy were not in the
least misleading and were, therefore, entitled to full First Amendment protection.
Certainly, that is how Justice Rehnquist-the lone dissenter-read the Court's
opinion. "Unless the State can show that these advertisements are either actually
untruthful or misleading, it presumably is not free to restrict in any way
commercial efforts on the part of those who profit from the sale of prescription
drugs to put them in the widest possible circulation., 43 Disagreeing with this
result, Justice Rehnquist took the Meiklejohnian perspective that the First
Amendment was meant to protect speech regarding "political, social or other
public issues, rather than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to
37. Id. at 772.
38. Id. at 771 n.24.
39. Because advertisers have both knowledge of and access to their own products,
the Court assumed that advertisers can check the accuracy of their claims. Id. at 777
(Stewart, J., concurring).
40. The durability rationale rests on the assumption that sellers must advertise to
market their products or services successfully. Id. at 771 n.24.
41. Id.
42. Id. Both of these differences between commercial and other types of speech
have been severely criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech? 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 635-38 (1990)
[hereinafter Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid] (arguing that the distinctions are
"unsupported by good explanations"); Redish, supra note 10, at 567-68 (disputing that
commercial claims are either more verifiable or more durable than political statements,
and identifying both factors as "wholly irrelevant" in the case of a blanket ban); Steven
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1984) (describing the
verifiability distinction as having "weak empirical foundations" and the durability
rationale as "a logical mistake"). But see Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The
Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 411,469-72 (1992) (endorsing
view that commercial speech is both more verifiable and durable than other speech).
43. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 788 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 63
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purchase one or another kind of shampoo." To save the First Amendment from
what he saw as its devaluation, Rehnquist preferred the old economic approach
to commercial speech where the Court deferred to the state's legislative
judgment.' Ten years later, his view would again come to the forefront of the
Court's commercial speech analysis.
B. A Compromise Solution: Central Hudson Creates a Balancing Act
For several years following the Virginia Pharmacy decision, the Court
endeavored both to protect commercial speech based on an anti-paternalism
rationale, and to limit advertising practices that it viewed as potentially
overreaching. So, for example, the Court in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona used
anti-paternalism to establish that attorneys have a First Amendment right to
advertise their services and prices.47  Drawing a comparison to Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court invalidated the state law on the grounds that it was
designed "to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep the
public in ignorance." '48
Alternatively, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass n,49 the Court upheld a bar
association rule that prevented lawyers from promoting themselves through in-
person solicitation. The Court characterized such conduct as a business
transaction that raised only marginal First Amendment concerns.50 While
Ohralik's facts presented a real risk of consumer deception based on undue
influence,"' the Court was not careful to limit its rhetoric to such situations.
44. Id. at 787. Professor Meiklejobn argued that only speech that promoted
successful self-government should be fully protected by the First Amendment. See
generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONsTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
45. Justice Rehnquist objected that the Court's reasoning:
[Miakes no allowance whatever for what appears to have been a
considered legislative judgment in most States that while prescription
drugs are a necessary and vital part of medical care and treatment,
there are sufficient dangers attending their widespread use that they
simply may not be promoted in the same manner as hair creams,
deodorants, and toothpaste.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 788 (Relmquist, J., dissenting).
46. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
47. Id. at 384.
48. Id. at 365.
49. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
50. Id. at 457-58.
51. Mr. Ohralik aggressively pursued employment by two 18-year-old accident
victims, one of whom he approached in her hospital room while she was in traction, in
a manner Justice Marshall described as a "classic example[] of 'ambulance chasing,'
fraught with obvious potential for misrepresentation and overreaching." Id. at 469
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
1998]
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Echoing Justice Rehnquist's concerns in Virginia Pharmacy5 2 that constitutional
protection for advertising would dilute First Amendment coverage for political
speech,53 the Court concluded that commercial speech received only a "limited
measure of [First Amendment] protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values." In its next major commercial
speech case, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York,55 the Court took these words out of the deceptive-
practice context to justify limiting First Amendment protection for all-even
truthful-commercial speech.
In Central Hudson, the Court tried to devise a compromise between the two
opposing views of commercial speech represented by Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Virginia
Pharmacy.16 Ironically, the resulting four-part test satisfied neither of them. 7
Central Hudson involved one state's attempt to conserve electricity during
the energy crisis of the mid-1970s. To reduce demand for power, the New York
utility commission ordered utilities in that state to refrain from all promotional
advertising.s Although the advertising at issue was accurate and not misleading,
the Court did not invalidate the order based on Virginia Pharmacy's aversion to
paternalistic manipulations of consumer behavior. Instead, the Court cited
Ohralik for the proposition that "[t]he Constitution . . . accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression."59
After relegating all commercial speech to an inferior constitutional
category, the Court outlined a four-part test for determining the constitutionality
of advertising restrictions. First, the Court said the Constitution does not pose
any obstacle to a state prohibition against false, misleading, or deceptive
advertising, or advertising regarding an illegal activity.' Commercial speech,
52. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
53. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
54. Id.
55. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
56. Justice Blackmun, in the Virginia Pharmacy majority opinion, stated that all
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech should receive full First Amendment
protection, and Justice Relnquist, in his dissent, argued that commercial speech deserved
no First Amendment protection at all. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
57. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, stating that the Court's four-part
test "does not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive
commercial speech." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the Court's decision "fails to give due deference
to th[e] subordinate position of commercial speech." Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
58. Id. at 558-59.
59. Id. at 563.
60. Id. at 563-64.
[Vol. 63
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which the Court defined as "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker,"' is not eligible for First Amendment protection unless it is
truthful and concerns a lawful product or service.62 Second, commercial
expression that fulfills this threshold requirement may still be regulated if the
State justifies the restriction pursuant to a substantial state interest.63 Third, the
restriction must directly advance that state interest; and finally, the restriction
must be "designed carefully to achieve the State's goal.' 4
Pursuant to this four-part analysis, the Court overturned the utility
commission's order forbidding promotional advertising of electricity. The Court
agreed that energy conservation constituted a substantial state interest.6 The
Court also assumed that the order would have a direct effect on power usage
because "Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it
believed that promotion would increase its sales." 66 However, the order failed
the test's fourth prong because it was overbroad. According to the Court, the
order applied to more speech than necessary because it would prevent the utility
from advertising efficient uses of energy as well as wasteful ones.67
Based on this reasoning, the Court implied that an order prohibiting only
advertisements that promoted inefficient (although certainly legal) uses of
electricity would have been upheld. As Justice Blackmun noted in his
concurrence, this implication turned the Court's anti-paternalism rationale on its
head.68 Such a restriction would advance the state interest in energy
conservation "not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public
of the information needed to make a free hoice" 69 -exactly what Virginia
Pharmacy had forbidden.
Although the four-part Central Hudson test effectively limited the amount
of First Amendment protection originally given to nondeceptive commercial
speech in Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Rehnquist still believed that even this
reduced First Amendment coverage encroached on the State's authority to
regulate business transactions. In his CentralHudson dissenting opinion, Justice
Rehnquist described the utility commission's order as an economic regulation
61. Id. at 561.
62. Id. at 566.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 564.
65. Id. at 568. The Court also found that the state's interest in fair and efficient
rate-making qualified as substantial. Id. However, under the test's third prong, the Court
described the link between the advertising restriction and the utility's rate structure as "at
most, tenuous." Id. at 569.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 570. The Court also noted that the state had not shown that its interests
could not be advanced by more limited regulation of speech, such as by requiring
advertisements to include efficiency information for various services. Id. at 570-71.
68. Id. at 579.
69. Id. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19981
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to which the Court should show "virtually complete deference."70 However,
even Justice Rehnquist acceded to the Central Hudson formulation when the
inherent flexibility of the test became apparent. Writing for the Court in
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,7 he applied
Central Hudson's prongs in such a way as to provide significant deference to
state advertising restrictions.
Posadas has been described as the "low water mark" for commercial
speech.' In that case, Justice Rehnquist used the Central Hudson test to uphold
a ban on truthful casino advertising directed at Puerto Rican residents.73 The
State permitted casino advertising to be addressed only to tourists, even though
Puerto Rico had legalized many forms of gambling for both citizens and
tourists.74 The State claimed the ban was necessary to discourage casino
gambling among Puerto Ricans, thereby protecting them from gambling's
"serious harmful effects." 75
In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist deferred to Puerto Rico's legislative
judgment to conclude that this obviously paternalistic goal qualified as a
substantial state interest.76 The Court said the legislature's belief that the
advertising ban directly advanced the interest was "reasonable," despite the lack
of any state substantiation.77 The Court had no trouble finding that the
prohibition satisfied Central Hudson's final prong. Again, the Court left it to the
legislature to decide if other remedies, such as counterspeech, would discourage
gambling as effectively as the advertising ban.78 Justice Rehnquist reasoned,
most notoriously, that the government's power to forbid products or activities
(such as gambling) gave it the lesser power to prohibit advertising of such
products or activities.79 Applied literally, this sweeping pronouncement could
have justified virtually complete government regulation of commercial speech. 0
70. Id. at 591 (Relnquist, J., dissenting).
71. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
72. P. Cameron De Vore, The Two Faces of Commercial Speech under the First
Amendment, 12 CoMM. LAW. 1, 23 (1994).
73. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340-44.
74. Id. at 332.
75. Id. at 341.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 342.
78. Id. at 344.
79. Id. at 346.
80. According to this rationale, only commercial speech pertaining to activities
that are constitutionally protected, such as the purchase of contraceptives or abortion
services, would be entitled to First Amendment protection. Because the range of
independently constitutionally protected economic transactions is quite small, this would
effectively eviscerate constitutional protection for commercial speech. See Philip B.
Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co.: "'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing
Strange, 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 12-13 (stating
[Vol. 63
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Commentators roundly criticized the Posadas result and Justice Rehnquist's
"greater-power-includes-the-lesser" dictum as inconsistent with both the Court's
prior commercial speech decisions and First Amendment principles."1 Although
some scholars speculated that the decision might be nothing more than an
aberration, 2 the case clearly demonstrated the subjectiveness of the Central
Hudson test. That test was weakened even further three years later in Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox.3 In that case, the Court
ruled that restrictions on commercial speech are constitutional even if they do
not meet the least restrictive means test. 4 Justice Scalia, writing for a six judge
majority, stated that Central Hudson's fourth prong required only that there be
a "reasonable" fit between the legislative goals and the regulation enacted to
achieve them. 5
Following Posadas and Fox, the Central Hudson test had become so elastic
as to give no meaningful guidance to commercial speakers regarding when or
whether advertising would receive First Amendment protection. The Court's
decisions wavered between invalidating advertising restrictions as paternalistic
and upholding them in deference to state legislative goals. By embracing both
anti-paternalism rhetoric in some commercial speech cases and pro-paternalism
results in others, the Court provided itself with precedent to do anything it
pleased with respect to advertising. These cases reflect the Court's lack of
consensus on why commercial speech should be constitutionally protected.
Furthermore, the Central Hudson formulation was too easily manipulated and
too inconsistently applied to qualify as a real "test" for commercial speech. 6 In
that if the "greater includes the lesser" rationale was applied, no advertising would be
free from government censorship).
81. See, e.g., Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater
Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 386 n.76 (1995) (listing
critical reviews of Posadas decision); Kurland, supra note 80, at 12 (concluding that
Posadas decision did not comport with the Court's prior commercial speech decisions);
Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 935 (1992)
(criticizing Posadas as overly deferential to legislative judgments regarding advertising
restrictions); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First
Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (describing Posadas as irreconcilable with
both Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson).
82. See, e.g., De Vore, supra note 72, at 23-24 (describing Posadas as a weak
authority in part because of its "unusual facts").
83. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
84. Id. at 478.
85. Id. at 470.
86. Many commentators have remarked on the failings of the Central Hudson test.
See e.g., Christopher C. Faille, Spinning the Roulette Wheel: Commercial Speech and
Philosophical Cogency, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 58, 60 (1994); Kozinski & Banner Who's
Afraid, supra note 42, at 631; Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial
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a series of cases beginning with City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,87
the Court attempted to remedy Central Hudson's inadequacies, both by fine-
tuning individual prongs of the test and by reasserting the value of commercial
speech. Most recently, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,88 some of the
Justices advocated scrapping the Central Hudson test with respect to accurate,
nonmisleading commercial speech. 9
C. Back to the Future: Liquormart and the Return of
Commercial Speech
Commercial speech's time in the First Amendment sun looked seriously
limited after Central Hudson, Posadas, and Fox. However, in 1993, the clouds
cleared when Justice Stevens delivered a ringing endorsement of commercial
speech's value for a six judge majority in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc.90 In that case, the Court invalidated Cincinnati's ban on
commercial newsracks, saying that the City had not established a "reasonable
fit," under the fourth prong of Central Hudson, with the City's goals of
improving street and sidewalk safety and appearance.9 The ordinance, which
would have required the removal of sixty-two newsracks that dispensed free
advertising publications while leaving more than 1,500 traditional newspaper
racks on the streets, would have had a negligible effect on the City's goal.'
Furthermore, the Court faulted the City for not first regulating the size, shape,
appearance, and number of newsracks. 93 Although the Court emphasized it was
not applying a "least-restrictive-means" test, it noted that "if there are numerous
and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial
speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit'
between ends and means is reasonable." 94 In Discovery Network, the Court
strengthened the fourth part of the Central Hudson test by refusing to accept the
City's word that the restriction was sufficiently tailored.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens reached several other
interesting conclusions. First, he noted the City based its ordinance on the
premise that commercial speech was of lower constitutional value than other
speech.9" He rejected this supposition, stating that it "attaches more importance
to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases
87. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
88. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
89. See infra notes 114-43 and accompanying text.
90. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
91. Id. at417.
92. Id. at417-18.
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warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech. 96 He
also cast doubt on any categorical approach to commercial speech in general,
pointing out that the distinction between a newspaper and a commercial
publication is far from clear and nothing more than a matter of degree.97
Most importantly, Justice Stevens recognized that Cincinnati's interest in
esthetics had some validity,9 but stated that the commercial/noncommercial
distinction did not relate to that interest. 99 Noncommercial newsracks were as
unattractive as commercial newsracks. Therefore, the ordinance did not address
a specific problem linked to the commercial nature of the speech."'° In other
words, advertising cannot be restricted just because it is commercial. Instead,
the state must assert an interest in deterring some risk that pertains directly to the
commercial speech which is the subject of the regulation. The Court went one
step further to identify the prevention of "commercial harms" as the usual state
interest that could justify commercial speech regulation.' This follows, the
Court said, because avoiding injuries that result from inaccurate or misleading
advertising is "the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to
greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.'
0 2
Although in cases such as Discovery Network, the Court devoted significant
attention to the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson," the second part of
the test-the requirement that the restriction advance a substantial state
interest-was virtually ignored. For example, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,"
the Court considered a federal law that prohibited brewers from including
alcohol content on their labels, ostensibly to preclude them from competing
based on the strength of their beers.' Coors wanted to list alcohol content on
96. Id. at 419.
97. Id. at 419-23.
98. Id. at418.
99. Id. at 424.
100. Id. at 425-26.
101. Id. at 426.
102. Id.
103. The Court also strengthened the third prong of Central Hudson in Edenfleld
v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993), by requiring the state to provide studies or anecdotal
evidence that a solicitation ban directly advanced the state interest in consumer
protection. However, Edenfield's requirement that the state prove that a commercial
speech restriction advance a state interest "in a direct and material way," was also
vulnerable to indiscriminate application. Id. at 767. For example, in Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626-28 (1995), the Court held that a bar association study
satisfied the state's burden to show that its rule against direct-mail solicitations directly
advanced its interest in protecting accident victims' privacy. In his dissent, Justice
Kennedy observed that the study included no actual survey results, no descriptions of
methodology or statistical assumptions, and was "noteworthy for its incompetence." Id.
at 640 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
105. Id. at 483-84. Coors argued that the real purpose behind the regulation,
1998]
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its labels to correct the consumer misperception that its beers were weaker than
other brands.' °6 In applying the Central Hudson test, the Court agreed that
"strength wars" could lead to increased alcoholism "and its attendant social
costs."107 The Court concluded, therefore, that the labeling law served a
substantial state interest in protecting citizens' health, safety, and welfare by
"preventing consumers from choosing beers on the basis of alcohol content."' 08
Although the Court overturned the labeling law for failing parts three and four
of the Central Hudson test,"° the substantial interest approved by the Court was
just the sort of paternalistic social engineering that Virginia Pharmacy decried.
Despite the truthfulness of the information about alcohol content, the state
preferred that it be kept from consumers, for their own good.
Justice Stevens, concurring only in the judgment, chastised the Court for
recognizing a substantial state interest in a law that restricted the availability of
accurate information, calling such a purpose an "anathema to the First
Amendment.' '. He found the commercial/noncommercial distinction to be
irrelevant in a case involving truthful speech."' Coors' beer label was entitled
to full First Amendment protection because it did not present a risk of consumer
harm or deception-which Justice Stevens saw as the only supportable rationale
which was enacted in 1935, was to prevent brewers from making inaccurate claims about
alcohol content at a time when brewers lacked the technology to ensure uniform alcohol
levels in their beers. Id. at 484.
106. Id. at 487.
107. Id. at 485.
108. Id. at 487.
109. With respect to Central Hudson's third prong, the Court concluded that the
state had failed to show a direct link between labeling and the threat of strength wars.
Id. at 489. Furthermore, the Court determined that the statute would be ineffective to
prevent competition based on alcohol content because the same law required or permitted
that alcohol content be listed on wine and distilled spirit labels. Id. at 488. By implying
that the labeling law, like the advertising prohibition in Central Hudson, was
unconstitutional only because it did not work, the Court reinforced its paternalistic
conclusion that influencing consumer choice through suppression of information was
acceptable under the First Amendment.
Concerning Central Hudson's fourth prong, the Court held that alternatives existed
by which the government could combat strength wars without interfering with free
speech, including "directly limiting the alcohol content of beers." Id. at 490-91. In
reaching that conclusion, the Court acknowledged that Congress' power to limit beer's
alcohol content did not include the right to limit commercial speech with respect to
alcohol content. Id. Although technically only dicta, this repudiated the "greater-
includes-the-lesser" argument from Posadas.
110. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens described the labeling law as "nothing more than an attempt
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for regulating commercial speech in the first place."2 Justice Stevens disavowed
what he called Central Hudson's "misguided approach" with respect to
situations involving restrictions on accurate, nonmisleading, informative
commercial speech."'
A year later, Justice Stevens gathered support for his position when the
Court's dissatisfaction with the Central Hudson test finally came to a head in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.14 In that case, Rhode Island prohibited off-
premises advertising of liquor prices in an attempt to promote temperance by
keeping liquor prices high." 5 As noted by Professor Sullivan, the case was no
more than a reprise of Virginia Pharmacy, and therefore should have been a
practically effortless exercise for the Court." 6 Indeed, the Justices in Liquormart
unanimously struck down the law on First Amendment grounds, but not without
a great deal of effort. Whereas in 1976, the Court could have merely cited
Virginia Pharmacy to overturn the law, in 1996 it had to deal with Central
Hudson.
As a result, four opinions were written by the Justices, none of which
gathered more than four votes." 7 Justice Stevens wrote Liquormart's plurality
opinion, in which he reiterated his position on commercial speech from earlier
cases, without explicitly abandoning the Central Hudson test. He emphasized
that the commercial speech doctrine had developed "to ensure that advertising
provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods
and services,"". and reasserted Virginia Pharmacy's anti-paternalism
rationale." 9 He identified two categories of commercial speech regulation:
advertising restrictions designed to protect consumers from inaccurate,
incomplete, or misleading information; and advertising bans that prohibit
truthful, nondeceptive commercial messages for reasons "unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process."'2 According to Justice Stevens
(joined only by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg on this point), only the former
are subject to the "less than strict review" of Central Hudson, while the latter
deserve "the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.''
Pursuant to this two-tiered analysis, the only state interest that could trigger
112. Id. at 494-97.
113. Id. at493.
114. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
115. Id. at 489-92.
116. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 138-39.
117. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion was joined, for the most part, by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg; Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote separate concurring
opinions; and Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment that was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer.
118. Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
119. Id. at497.
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Central Hudson-style intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech restrictions
would be the prevention of consumer deception or overreaching."
Justice Stevens (writing again for a plurality) concluded that "even under
the less than strict standard" of Central Hudson, the advertising ban would
fail." As he applied the test, Central Hudson's third prong would require the
State to prove direct links among price advertising, liquor prices, and liquor
consumption-something the State had not done beyond mere "speculation or
conjecture." 4 Additionally, Justice Stevens said Central Hudson's fourth prong
was not met because Rhode Island could institute higher liquor prices and
encourage temperance among its citizens in many ways that did not restrict
speech."2 These included direct price regulation, higher liquor taxation, and
citizen education. 26 Finally, Justice Stevens (joined on this point by Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg) rejected both the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
justification for regulating commercial speech"7 and the notion of a "vice"
exemption for advertising related to unpopular or risky items.'
Although both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas disapproved of the
Central Hudson test in their respective concurring opinions,'29 Justice Scalia
remained non-committal, while Justice Thomas bravely charted new territory.
Although he disliked Central Hudson, Justice Scalia felt unsure about what
should replace it. Therefore, he merely concurred in striking down the
advertising ban without either "develop[ing] new law, or reinforc[ing] old, on
this issue.' 30 Justice Thomas, on the other hand, advocated a return to Virginia
Pharmacy's holding that "all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by
keeping them ignorant are impermissible.' 3' Justice Thomas said that the
commercial/noncommercial distinction is unjustified when the government
122. Id. at 502. Justice Stevens rejected the much maligned "commonsense
differences" between commercial and noncommercial speech, and instead identified the
state interest in preventing commercial harms as the real reason that commercial speech
is sometimes subject to less than full First Amendment protection. Id. For a discussion
of the "commonsense differences," see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
123. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion).
124. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
125. Id. at 507.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 510-13.
128. Id. at 513-14.
129. Justice Scalia stated that the Central Hudson test has "nothing more than
policy intuition to support it." Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and injudgment);
Justice Thomas described it as so "inherently nondeterminative" that it cannot be applied
uniformly, but rather is controlled by individual judges' preferences and biases. Id. at
527 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
130. Id. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
131. Id. at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
[Vol. 63
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restricts speech in an attempt to manipulate behavior, and therefore, Central
Hudson's balancing approach is not only irrelevant, but nonsensical.1
2
Even the Justices who advocated retaining the Central Hudson test applied
it in an unusually narrow way. In her concurrence, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Breyer and Justice Souter, Justice O'Connor found
that the statute failed Central Hudson's last prong because it unnecessarily
burdened speech.'33 The State could impose higher liquor prices, and thereby
deter liquor consumption in many other ways that were less oppressive to
speech, such as establishing minimum prices, increasing sales taxes on liquor,
or implementing an educational program to encourage moderation.'
Additionally, Justice O'Connor disavowed the Posadas approach of treating
state advertising restrictions with unquestioning deference. 135 Rather, courts
must take "a closer look" to ensure that the speech restriction both advances a
substantial state interest and is narrowly tailored.
36
Where does Liquormart leave the commercial speech doctrine? For one
thing, the case practically guarantees that restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading
commercial information about lawful commodities are invalid, regardless of
whether the Central Hudson test is used or not. 37 Whether the Court applies
strict scrutiny in such situations (Justice Stevens' approach), invalidates the
restriction based on anti-paternalism (Justice Thomas' choice) or applies a
stricter version of Central Hudson's third and fourth prongs (Justice O'Connor's
preference), the result should be the same. 38 As Justice Thomas noted in his
concurrence, direct regulation of a product and state-sponsored counterspeech
132. Id. at 518, 523-24.
133. Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 531-32.
136. Id. at531.
137. Some courts have tried to distinguish Liquornart as involving a "total ban"
on advertising. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir.
1996) (upholding ban on billboard advertising of alcoholic beverages in certain areas of
city as time, place, and manner restriction rather than "blanket ban"), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1569 (1997). However, the term "total ban" is a tautology: whatever is banned
is always totally banned. For example, inLiquormart, off-premises advertising of liquor
prices was totally banned, but liquor sellers could still display signs advertising prices
within their stores.
138. At least, it should be the same as long as other nonspeech alternatives have
not been implemented. For example, assume that Rhode Island restricted liquor price
advertising as part of a comprehensive program to encourage temperance that included
increased taxation of alcoholic beverages and an educational campaign to preach
moderation. Now under Justice O'Connor's approach, the advertising ban might well be
upheld as one step among many needed to achieve a substantial state interest. Under




Casarez: Casarez: Don't Tell Me What to Say:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
are always available and will always be less burdensome on speech than
restrictions on advertising 39
The case certainly marks an end to the deferential application of the Central
Hudson test and presages a new approach to commercial speech. What is that
approach likely to be? The Court's decision in Discovery Network, together with
its decision in Liquormart, shows the Court's growing acceptance of "the
preservation of a fair bargaining process"'"4 as the rationale behind commercial
speech regulation. 4' The reason for granting commercial speech less than full
First Amendment protection is to protect consumers from commercial harms.
This explains why false commercial speech can be regulated when inaccurate
political speech remains fully protected.4 Just as libel laws favor protecting
individuals' reputations from false, defamatory statements over First
Amendment absolutism, so consumer protection laws reflect a policy choice to
shield purchasers from false and misleading advertising.'43 Clearly, neither
Liquormart's liquor sellers nor Virginia Pharmacy's pharmacists would have
been granted full First Amendment protection to advertise erroneous prices.
However, because their commercial messages were truthful and thus presented
139. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 524-25 (1993) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and in judgment).
140. Id. at 501 (Stevens, Kennedy, & Ginsburg, JJ., plurality opinion).
141. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,426 (1993)
("Cincinnati has not asserted an interest in preventing commercial harms by regulating
the information distributed by respondent publishers' newsracks, which is, of course, the
typical reason why commercial speech Can be subject to greater governmental regulation
than noncommercial speech"); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1992)
(describing "risk of fraud" as "one of the characteristics of commercial speech that
justifies depriving it of full First Amendment protection").
142. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (noting that false and deceptive commercial speech
may be regulated by the state because "[tihe First Amendment... does not prohibit the
State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as
freely"); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993) (stating that First
Amendment protection for commercial speech is designed to safeguard societal interests
in "broad access to complete and accurate commercial information").
143. Some commentators have noted that consumer protection laws themselves
are paternalistic because they assume purchasers cannot protect themselves from false
information or deceptive practices. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much
Puff' Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1205, 1242
(1988).
However, even Justice Thomas, who took the strongest position against paternalism
in Liquormart, described paternalism as "manipulating consumer choices or public
opinion through the suppression of accurate 'commercial' information." 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in
judgment) (emphasis added). Apparently, restricting inaccurate or deceptive commercial
information would not constitute objectionable paternalism even for Justice Thomas.
[Vol. 63
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no danger of consumer fraud, these sellers should not have to rely on a Central
Hudson analysis to claim First Amendment coverage.
In summary, commercial speech began this century as a mere outgrowth of
business, with the result that advertising restrictions were subject only to the
rational basis review given to other economic regulations. Since then, the
evolution of the commercial speech doctrine has consisted of three major
developments. First, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy granted First Amendment
protection to truthful, nondeceptive commercial speech to ensure the free flow
of reliable consumer information. This development benefitted purchasers and
sellers alike. As an obvious corollary, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy also
stated that commercial speech could be regulated to prevent inaccurate,
misleading messages or overreaching sales practices. Second, the Court in
Central Hudson reduced the First Amendment protection granted to truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech to an intermediate level. Central Hudson
created a four-part balancing test that the Court applied strictly, to invalidate
advertising prohibitions, and with great deference to state legislative judgments.
Finally, the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with the Central Hudson
test appears to have led the Court back to its original thinking in Virginia
Pharmacy. Cases such as Discovery Network and Liquormart have shown the
Court's dissatisfaction with Central Hudson, along with a growing consensus
that truthful, nondeceptive advertising should be entitled to full First Amendment
protection. This would mean advertising should be subject to a reduced level of
First Amendment scrutiny only when necessary to protect consumers from
commercial harms. As shown in Part Im of this Article, the First Amendment
standard used to evaluate advertising restrictions should also be applied to assess
the constitutionality of regulations compelling commercial speech.
IlI. THE RIGHT To BE SiLENT: A COMPLEMENTARY COMPONENT To
FREE SPEECH
Thirty years before the Supreme Court granted constitutional protection to
commercial speech, it recognized that free expression was a two-sided coin: it
included not only the right to be free from government censorship, but also the
right to refrain from speaking at all. The right to remain silent originated in
cases involving political, religious, ideological, or other fully protected speech.
In the commercial context, government-mandated disclosure requirements have
been presumed to be within the state's purview, based on commercial speech's
lower constitutional status. However, at least with respect to truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech, Liquormart has changed the rules regarding
that status. This section of the Article describes the development of "negative
free speech rights"1" in ideological and commercial contexts. It concludes that
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the only commercial disclosure requirements that should be subject to the less-
than-strict scrutiny of Central Hudson are those that protect consumers from
commercial harms.
A. Our "Fixed Star": Ideological Speech Cannot be Compelled'45
The fact that the First Amendment prohibits the state from compelling
speech of a religious, political, or ideological nature has been determined beyond
question. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,146 the Court
held that religious objectors could not be forced to salute the flag.147 The Court
stated that the First Amendment does not allow "public authorities to compel [an
individual] to utter what is not in his mind.' 4  Similarly, in Wooley v.
Maynard,49 the Court concluded that a state cannot require its citizens to display
the state motto "Live Free or Die" on their cars. 50 In his opinion for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[a] system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the
concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts."''
The right to be free from compelled political speech has been upheld in
various contexts. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court held
that a newspaper could not be obliged to provide reply space to political
candidates who had been criticized in print. Similarly, the Court has ruled that
political pamphleteers cannot be forced to put their names on the work,'5 and
that private parade organizers may not be required to include marchers who
advocate incompatible views. 54  According to the Court, "one important
manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak
may also decide 'what not to say. ' 'A
5
In a related line of cases, the Court has also recognized that the state cannot
compel individuals to pay for someone else's ideological speech. In the leading
145. "[I]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein." West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
146. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
147. Id. at 642.
148. Id. at 634.
149. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
150. Id. at 713.
151. Id. at 714.
152. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
153. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
154. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 580
(1995).
155. Id. at 573 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S.
1, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
[Vol. 63
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/2
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
case of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,'56 the Court upheld an "agency
shop" arrangement where a teacher's union charged non-union members
"service fees" equal to union dues.5 7 Non-union members objected that their
funds were being used to finance the union's political activities.'58 The Court
held that the service charge was permissible to the extent that those monies were
used to further the union's collective bargaining activities, a use seen as
"germane" to important state interests. 59 However, the Court ruled that the
service fees violated non-union members' First Amendment rights to the extent
those funds supported the union's political agenda. 6 The Abood rule was
applied to a State's integrated bar association in Keller v. State Bar of
California.'61 In Keller the Court held that compulsory membership dues could
not be used to finance the bar association's ideological or political programs, but
could be used for bar activities relevant to the State's interest in regulating and
improving legal services.
162
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,163 a
case that presented an interesting blend of compelled political and commercial
speech, the Court held that professional fund-raisers could not be forced to tell
potential donors the percentage of funds raised in past campaigns that went to
costs and fees, as opposed to charity.'6 Earlier cases held that charitable
solicitations are fully protected under the First Amendment.16s In defending the
statute, the State argued that the law actually regulated commercial speech
because it dealt only with the professional fund-raisers' ability to make a
profit.'6 The Court stated that "[p]urely commercial speech is more susceptible
to compelled disclosure requirements,"' 67 but disagreed that the speech in this
case was truly commercial. The Court held that the regulation was entitled to
strict scrutiny because the fund-raisers' mandated disclosure was "inextricably
intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech."'
6
According to the Court in Riley, when the speech involved is "fully
protected," laws compelling speech are subject to the same constitutional test as
laws restricting speech. 69 The Court said that whether the State tries to prohibit
156. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
157. Id. at211.
158. Id. at 212-13.
159. Id. at 235-36.
160. Id. at 234-35.
161. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
162. Id. at 14.
163. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
164. Id. at 798.
165. Id. at 787-89.
166. Id. at 795.
167. Id. at 796 n.9.
168. Id. at 796.
169. Id. at 797.
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or compel protected speech makes no constitutional difference because in either
situation, the regulation would have to survive strict scrutiny analysis. 70 In
1988, when Riley was decided, the Court did not consider any commercial
speech (truthful or not) to be fully protected; rather, it was seen as an inferior
category of expression subject only to intermediate scrutiny.' To the extent that
later cases such as Discovery Network and Liquormart have enlarged
constitutional coverage for truthful, nondeceptive commercial speech, Riley
would indicate that commercial disclosure requirements are also entitled to more
than perfunctory review. If commercial speech qualifies for less than full First
Amendment scrutiny only to protect consumers from commercial harms,'73 then
commercial disclosure requirements also should be subject to a lower First
Amendment standard only as needed to preserve a fair bargaining process. In
other words, the state should not be allowed to compel commercial speech based
on governmental interests other than consumer protection if it is not allowed to
restrict commercial speech for those same purposes. As will be seen below, the
Court identified the prevention of consumer fraud as the justification for
commercial disclosure requirements back in 1976 in its Virginia Pharmacy
decision.
B. Commercial Speech: Susceptible to Compelled Disclosure to
Protect Consumers
When commercial speech first attained constitutional legitimacy in Virginia
Pharmacy,74 the Court, in a footnote, added that advertisers could be required
to include disclaimers or additional information necessary to make commercial
messages nondeceptive.Y The Court said these disclosures were justified by the
"commonsense differences" between commercial and noncommercial speech:
the alleged greater verifiability and toughness that makes commercial speech
harder to chill. A year later, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 77 the Court
noted in dicta that the State could require lawyer advertisements to include
"some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer.., to assure
that the consumer is not misled."'7 Therefore, consumer protection was the only
interest identified that could justify compelling commercial advertisers to
provide additional information about their products.
170. Id. at 796-97.
171. Id. at 795.
172. See supra Part II.C of this Article.
173. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
174. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See also supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
175. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
176. Id. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
177. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
178. Id. at 384.
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The Court considered the constitutionality of such a disclosure requirement
for the first time in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio.179 In that case, an Ohio disciplinary rule required lawyers who
advertised contingent rates to state in those ads that clients would be responsible
for litigation costs even if their claims were unsuccessful. 80 The Court said that
when commercial advertising is concerned, "material differences" exist between
disclosure requirements and speech restrictions.'81 The State's rule here did not
compel attorneys to advance a particular ideological or political stance as in
Wooley or Barnette,1 nor did it limit the amount of information available to the
public' 3 Instead, the State required attorneys to include "purely factual and
uncontroversial information.''" Without this, contingent-fee ads created what
the Court saw as a "self-evident" likelihood of deception!8 As long as they are
not overly burdensome, disclosure requirements only need to be reasonably
related to the state interest in consumer protection to pass constitutional
muster. 8 6 Furthermore, the Court saw no need to inquire whether the state
interest could be achieved by less restrictive means because disclosure
requirements are always less restrictive than laws that suppress speech.
187
Justice Brennan wrote separately to emphasize his view that commercial
disclosure requirements could be justified only if they met the same standards
applied to commercial speech restrictions-the Central Hudson test. 88 While
preventing deceptive advertising clearly qualified as a substantial state interest,
Justice Brennan said that the State must prove either that the advertising is
inherently likely to deceive or that the advertising has actually deceived
consumers. 89 Additionally, the State must show that the disclosure requirement
effectively counteracts the deception and "may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to prevent the deception."'" Based on the public's unfamiliarity with
the intricacies of contingent-fee arrangements, Justice Brennan concluded that
the Ohio costs disclaimer could satisfy the Central Hudson standard as long as
it was not overly extensive."'
Justice Brennan, however, found fault with two other disclosure
requirements which Ohio applied to attorneys who advertised contingent-fee
179. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
180. Id. at 633.
181. Id. at 650.
182. Id. at 651. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
183. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
184. Id. at 651.
185. Id. at 652-53.
186. Id. at 651.
187. Id. at 651 n.14.
188. Id. at 657-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 658 n.2, 659.
190. Id. at 658 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,203 (1982)).
191. Id. at 660.
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arrangements: first, that those ads specify the lawyers' rates; and second, that
those ads set out in full the terms of the proposed fee relationship."9 The Court
wholly ignored the latter and barely mentioned the former requirement, saying
only in a footnote that it did not seem either unreasonable or "unduly
burdensome."'93 Justice Brennan took the Court to task for not examining
whether consumers were actually being deceived by attorney ads that did not
include rate information. He also believed the Court should have determined
whether forcing lawyers to list fees in those ads could actually make them
misleading, because global estimates could never take into account the unique
legal circumstances of individual clients.' 9 Finally, Justice Brennan pointed out
that requiring lawyers to include detailed fee information in their advertisements
was clearly unreasonable because it would "fill far more space than the
advertisement itself, would chill the publication of protected commercial speech
and would be entirely out of proportion to the State's legitimate interest in
preventing potential deception.' 95
Although Zauderer did not hold that commercial disclosure requirements
are outside the scope of First Amendment protection, the Court did evince an
easy-going attitude with respect to their review. The opinion contains dicta that
seem to derogate the First Amendment position of compelled commercial
speech. For example, the Court stated that "disclosure requirements trench much
more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech."'
The Court stated that "the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure
requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually
suppressed . ". .., In fact, one commentator has asserted that Zauderer
supports subjecting commercial disclosure requirements to no more than
substantive due process review, an inquiry that would not involve the First
Amendment.'98 However, a closer look shows that the Zauderer Court was
indeed employing a close cousin of the Central Hudson test, albeit not in as strict
or precise a manner as Justice Brennan. According to the Court, consumer
protection qualified as a substantial state interest,'" the possibility of deception
was "self-evident," 200 and the remedy was no more extensive than necessary
because it was not unduly burdensome."0'
That compelled commercial speech is subject to more than substantive due
process review also was apparent in lbanez v. Florida Department of Business
192. Id. at 660-64.
193. Id. at 653 n.15.
194. Id. at 660-61, 661 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 663-64.
196. Id. at 651.
197. Id. at 651 n.14.
198. See Sweetland, supra note 21, at 504.
199. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
200. Id. at 652.
201. Id. at 653 n15.
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and Professional Regulation.2° In that case, Florida law prohibited accountants
from listing any private certifications (such as "Certified Financial Planner") in
advertising or on promotional materials such as business cards unless
accompanied by an exhaustive disclaimer.2 °3 Using the language of Central
Hudson, the Court reserved the question of whether such a disclaimer could ever
be "an appropriately tailored check against deception or confusion."" 4 In the
instant case, the Court ruled that the disclaimer was not narrowly tailored
because it required too much detail to be included on stationery, business cards,
or in phone book listings.0 5 The Court faulted the State for providing no
evidence that either a disclaimer or a restriction on speech was needed to prevent
any actual, as opposed to "purely hypothetical," commercial harm.21 "If the
'protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force,"' 207 the Court
said, "we cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to
supplant the Board's burden to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.' 2 ' As in
Zauderer, the Court acknowledged that commercial disclosure requirements
could be justified only as a means to ensure commercial fair dealing.
In sum, although the state cannot require its citizens to engage in political,
religious, or ideological speech (either directly or indirectly through payment of
money) without satisfying the strict scrutiny test, commercial disclosure
requirements have been subjected to less stringent First Amendment analysis.
According to the Court in Riley, laws that restrict and compel speech are
constitutional equivalents only when the speech at issue is fully protected by the
First Amendment. More recently, the Court in Discovery Network and
Liquormart has begun to recognize that consumer protection provides the
underlying rationale for commercial speech regulation. The Court has also
recognized that truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech deserves full First
Amendment protection.2' Disclosure requirements, therefore, should be subject
to the "less than strict ' 210 standard of Central Hudson only when they advance
the state's interest in preventing commercial harms. Prior to the Court's decision
in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,211 that was the result-if not
202. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
203. Id. at 146.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 146-47.
206. Id. at 146.
207. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648-49
(1985)).
208. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
209. See supra Part I.C of this Article.
210. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens,
Kennedy, & Ginsburg, JJ., plurality opinion). See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying
text.
211. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
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always the rhetoric--of the Court's compelled commercial speech cases. The
Court has both said in dicta (Virginia Pharmacy, Bates) and held in its decisions
(Zauderer, lbanez) that sellers of products or services could be required to
provide additional information about those commodities only to prevent
deceptive sales practices. As will be seen in the next part of this Article, the
Court radically changed this approach to compelled commercial speech in
Gliclman. In that case, the Court found that a state-mandated advertising
program did not even implicate the First Amendment. This holding breathed
new life into an economic view of commercial speech not seen since
Chrestensen's demise.
IV. A SUBTLER ANALYSIS: GLICKMANAND THE ASCENDANCY OF
CONTEXT
Since at least the early 1980s, Justice Stevens has indicated his
dissatisfaction with an approach to the First Amendment that is exclusively
categorical2"2 where differing levels of constitutional protection are allocated to
various types of speech based on their content.2 3 In the hate-speech case, R.A. V.
v. St. Paul,2 14 Justice Stevens outlined in his concurrence what he called "a more
complex and subtle" First Amendment analysis; one that emphasized context-
specific factors as opposed to hard-to-define categories.215 With respect to the
constitutionality of the ordinance in that case, Justice Stevens identified the
content and character of the speech at issue, the context of the regulated speech,
and the nature and scope of the restriction as the determinative considerations." 6
According to Justice Stevens, "it is wiser to argue and decide one case at a time
... than it is to attempt to craft absolute propositions of law to answer a host of
questions that have not yet been tested in adversary litigation. 21 7
212. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (warning against "unnecessary insistence on rigid classifications" with
respect to commercial speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment) (stating that both content and context of a specific
communication must be considered in determining whether that communication receives
constitutional protection).
213. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(stating that "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has [sic] never been thought to raise any
constitutional problem"). For a discussion of the history of the categorical approach to
free expression, see 0. Lee Reed, Is Commercial Speech Really Less Valuable Than
Political Speech? On Replacing Values and Categories in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 34 AM. Bus. L. J. 1, 9-14 (1996).
214. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
215. Id. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring).
216. Id. at429-31.
217. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1311
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Justice Stevens garnered four other votes for his contextual theory of the
First Amendment in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.," a case
involving compelled commercial speech. In Glickman, Justice Stevens' opinion
for the Court relied on a host of contextual factors to conclude that a state-
mandated compulsory advertising scheme constituted nothing more than
economic regulation that fell outside the First Amendment altogether." 9 The
following section of this Article reviews the Court's treatment of compelled
commercial speech in Glickman, taking issue with both its reasoning and result.
A. The Glickman Decision: Compelled Commercial Speech as
Economic Regulation
In Glickman, sixteen California fruit growers, handlers, and processors
refused to pay for a generic advertising program mandated by the Federal
Government, and challenged the underlying marketing orders as violative of
their First Amendment rights.?0 The advertising campaign, which was approved
and implemented pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
(AMAA),21 was designed to increase consumer demand for California peaches,
plums, and nectarines.' The plaintiffs objected to the ads, claiming certain of
them fostered the belief that all brands of California tree fruits were identical in
quality, while others promoted fruit varieties grown only by the plaintiffs'
competitors.' Although the marketing orders were upheld in an administrative
proceeding and in federal district court, ' the Ninth Circuit invalidated them as
compelled commercial speech in violation of the handlers' First Amendment
rights.tm Applying the Central Hudson test, 6 the appellate court concluded that
the generic advertising program neither directly advanced the state interest in
promoting fruit sales, nor was narrowly tailored. 7
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court overturned the
Ninth Circuit's decision by a vote of five to four, and reached the startling
conclusion that the plaintiffs' claim did not even present a First Amendment
issue.? Prescient readers could glean the Court's conclusion from the second
(1993).
218. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
219. Id. at 2138-42.
220. Id. at 2134.
221. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-659 (1994).
222. Glicknan, 117 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
223. Id. at 2137 & nn.10-11.
224. Id. at 2135.
225. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1380 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
226. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
227. Wileman Bros., 58 F.3d at 1380.
228. Id. at 2141.
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paragraph of the opinion, where Justice Stevens characterized the marketing
orders as "a species of economic regulation"--a phrase redolent of
Chrestensen229 and Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Virginia
Pharmacy."o Indeed, the Court took a Chrestensen-like approach to the case,
upholding the marketing orders pursuant to the rational basis test, reasoning that
they were entitled to "the same strong presumption of validity that we accord to
other policy judgments made by Congress. '"
Justice Stevens pointed to the marketing orders' statutory context to justify
this conclusion?. 2 Significantly, the California tree fruit business was highly
regulated and collectivized in many ways pursuant to the AMAA other than with
respect to promotion and marketing.233 In accordance with the statute, the
marketing orders had been approved by either two-thirds of the affected
producers or by producers who sold at least two-thirds of the volume of the
regulated fruits. This prompted the Court to view the advertising assessments as
just another instance of legitimate majority rule."
Justice Stevens listed three additional contextual features of the generic
advertising program that he believed distinguished it from the Court's
commercial and compelled speech precedents. First, he noted that the marketing
orders did not prevent the fruit handlers from promulgating their own, individual
advertisements, ' 5 a factor he said differentiated the case from Central Hudson,
Virginia Pharmacy, and Liquormart.26 Second, he stated that although the
marketing orders required the plaintiffs to finance the advertising program, they
did not "compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. 237
Justice Stevens said this distinguished the case from compelled speech decisions
such as Barnette and Wooley.2 8 Finally, Justice Stevens noted the orders did not
force the fruit handlers to support, financially or otherwise, any political or
ideological beliefs they found distasteful,"s as opposed to the fact situations
presented in cases such as Abood and Keller.240  Dismissing the plaintiffs'
229. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
231. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130,2142 (1997).
232. Id. at2138.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2138.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2138 n.12. For a discussion of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), see supra Part II of this Article.
237. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1997).
238. Id. at 2138 n.13. For a discussion of Barnette and Wooley, see supra notes
146-51 and accompanying text.
239. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2138.
240. Id. at 2138 n.14. For a discussion of Abood and Keller, see supra notes 156-
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objections to the mandated advertisements as "trivial," the Court concluded that
the fruit producers did in fact all agree with the advertising program's
messages.24 In any event the Court said, the producers had no reason to object
because the ads were attributed to the industry as a whole, rather than to
individual growers.242
To bolster its conclusion that the marketing orders did not create a First
Amendment issue, the Court relied on the Abood line of cases243 for the
proposition that "assessments to fund a lawful collective program may
sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection of some members of the
group."9244 According to the Court, Abood held that individuals may not be forced
to contribute financially to an organization "whose expressive activities conflict
with one's 'freedom of belief,""'24 but only if those activities are not "germane"
to a legitimate governmental purpose.246 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
Glickman plaintiffs failed both parts of this two-pronged test. First, the required
assessments did not "engender any crisis of conscience" because they were used
to finance commercial, rather than ideological, messages.247 Second, the Court
found the generic advertising program "unquestionably germane" to the
regulatory purpose of the marketing orders-increasing market demand for
California tree fruits. 24 The Court relied on rational basis review to uphold the
compulsory advertising program, and chastised the Ninth Circuit for failing to
show "[a]ppropriate respect for the power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the States." '249
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, in part) disputed both the Court's conclusion
that coerced payment for commercial speech does not implicate the First
Amendment, and the legitimacy of the contextual factors relied on by the Court
to support that result."0 First, the dissenters accused the Court of misinterpreting
the Abood "germaneness" test as an either/or test: the government can force
62 and accompanying text.
241. Glickanan, 117 S. Ct. at2139.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 2139-40. Along with Abood and Keller, the Court also cited Lehnert
v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991), where the Court held that in an
agency-shop situation, non-union employees may be compelled to fund union activities
that (1) are "germane" to collective-bargaining; (2) are justified by the government's
policy interest in labor peace and preventing "free riders;" and (3) do not significantly
burden speech. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130,2140 (1997).
244. Id. at 2140.
245. Id. at 2139 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,235 (1977)).
246. Id. at 2140 (citing Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990)).
247. Id. at 2139.
248. Id. at 2140.
249. Id. at 2141.
250. Id. at 2142 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1998]
29
Casarez: Casarez: Don't Tell Me What to Say:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
payment for speech as long as the speech is either related to valid economic
regulation or is non-ideological in character. 2S  Justice Souter said this
interpretation cut too broadly and ignored significant speech interests.5 2
Pursuant even to Abood's germaneness formulation, compelled funding of
expressive activities "must also be justified by vital policy interests of the
government and not add significantly to the burdening of free speech inherent
in achieving those interests." 3
Second, the dissenters objected to the Court's inference that because the
government neither forbade the plaintiffs from purchasing their own ads nor
attributed any of the collective ads to an individual plaintiff, the government was
free to compel payment for non-ideological speech.' While Abood and Keller
involved political expression, those cases did not hold that the government can
freely compel other types of speech, which Justice Souter noted would include
art and entertainment as well as commercial messages.2 5 The dissenters
believed that regardless of the factual circumstances, being forced to pay for
either political or commercial speech implicates the First Amendment just as
surely as being forbidden to pay for such expression.256
Finally, Justice Souter opposed the Court's assumption that the plaintiffs
did not really disagree with the content of the generic advertisements, calling it
both "doubtful" and "beside the point even if true."25 7 Citing the Court's
compelled-speech precedents, Justice Souter rightly pointed out that objectors
to forced speech had never been required to prove actual disagreement with the
message to invoke the First Amendment. 28
Unlike the Court's contextual analysis, Justice Souter began from the
proposition that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, both
for speakers as well as listeners.259 As a result, laws that compel commercial
speech are just as suspect as ones that restrict it, and are subject to the same level
of constitutional scrutiny.26
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion (minus Justice Thomas as to this point)
identified the Central Hudson test as appropriate for evaluating laws that either
limit or compel commercial speech.26' In applying the test to Glickman's
marketing orders, Justice Souter found the orders wanting with respect to all
251. Id. at 2145-47.
252. Id. at 2147.
253. Id. at 2146.
254. Id. at 2147.
255. Id. at 2147, 2147 n.5 (citing Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65
(1981)).
256. Id. at 2147.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2148.
259. Id. at 2143.
260. Id. at 2144.
261. Id. at 2149.
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three prongs.262 First, Justice Souter disputed that the marketing orders served
the government's otherwise valid interest in stabilizing markets and preserving
prices because the AMAA authorized compelled advertising programs with
respect to some commodities in certain states and not others.263 To these
dissenters, this random implementation of compelled advertising programs
pursuant to the statute denied the substantiality of the government's asserted
interest.2' According to Justice Souter, "arbitrariness or underinclusiveness of
the scheme chosen by the government may well suggest that the asserted
interests either are not pressing or are not the real objects animating the
restriction on speech.'2
65
Second, Justice Souter faulted the Secretary of Agriculture for failing to
show any evidence that the compelled advertising program actually achieved the
government's interests any more than would a system of voluntary advertising.2
Justice Souter concluded that the mandatory advertising scheme imposed by the
marketing orders was not narrowly tailored.2 67 He cited a credit system, where
handlers' assessments were reduced according to any amount expended for
"branded" advertising, as an alternative that would achieve the same statutory
purposes without infiinging so deeply on the plaintiffs' speech interests.268
Although agreeing with the other dissenters' First Amendment analysis,
Justice Thomas filed a separate opinion objecting to Justice Souter's reliance on
the Central Hudson test to invalidate the generic advertising scheme.269 True to
his position in Liquormart, Justice Thomas emphasized his disapproval of both
the CentralHudson test and the "discounted weight given to commercial speech
generally.""27 Accordingly, to uphold the compelled advertising program in
Glicknan, Justice Thomas would have required it to pass strict scrutiny review.
Based on the Court's expanding notions of protected commercial speech,
and the Justices' recognition, either directly or indirectly, in Liquormart that
prevention of commercial harms provides the true basis for commercial speech
regulation,27' Justice Thomas took the more reasoned approach. The marketing
orders in Glickman were not designed to prevent marketplace overreaching or
consumer confusion; rather, they furthered the regulatory purpose of stabilizing
commodity markets.2" Therefore, the generic advertising campaign should have
been invalidated not because it failed to meet the Central Hudson test, but
262. Id.
263. Id. at2150-51.
264. Id. at 2150-52.
265. Id. at 2150.
266. Id. at2154.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 2155.
269. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
272. Glickrnan v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130,2140 (1997).
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because it did not advance the only goal that justifies less-than-full First
Amendment protection for commercial speech: consumer protection.
B. More Flies in Glickman 's Ointment: Should Free Speech Require
a "Crisis of Conscience? "
As the dissenting opinions show, Glickman constitutes a serious departure
from traditional commercial speech and compelled speech analysis. The
majority's contextual approach resulted in a house-of-cards opinion based on a
faulty premise: that compelled commercial speech does not raise a First
Amendment issue because its speakers do not suffer a "crisis of conscience.'
273
This premise overlooks three settled First Amendment principles: first, that
compelled speech is just as constitutionally suspect as restricted speech; second,
that paying for speech is constitutionally equivalent to speaking; and third, that
commercial speech falls within the scope of the First Amendment. It is obvious
that the Court ignored these principles after examining the contextual factors the
Court used to defend its decision.
First, the Court's argument that the marketing orders did not prevent the
fruit producers from purchasing their own advertisements states the obvious: the
statute compelled speech rather than prohibited it. If this point is to be given any
significance, it can only mean the Court believes that whereas restricted
commercial speech would be entitled to First Amendment protection, coerced
commercial speech is not. Logically, however, speech that falls within the First
Amendment should retain that protection in either context. As Justice Thomas
noted, "it is incongruous to suggest that forcing fruit-growers to contribute to a
collective advertising campaign does not even involve speech, while at the same
time effectively conceding that forbidding a fruit-grower from making those
same contributions voluntarily would violate the First Amendment."
274
Furthermore, the Court's "now you have it, now you don't" approach to
First Amendment coverage of commercial speech leaves all speech rights,
commercial or political, vulnerable to infringement. For example, based on the
Court's reasoning, New Hampshire's requirement in Wooley v. Maynard275 that
citizens' license plates display the state motto could easily have been upheld, as
long as Mr. Maynard was not forbidden from exhibiting his own bumper sticker
reading "New Hampshire's Motto is Idolatrous." '76 For many reasons, however,
speakers may prefer not to trumpet their own views. Regardless, the First
273. Id. at2139.
274. Id. at 2156 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
275. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). For a discussion of Wooley, see supra notes 149-51
and accompanying text.
276. As a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the plaintiff in that case objected
to the state motto "Live Free or Die" on both religious and political grounds. Wooley,
430 U.S. at 707-08, 708 n.2.
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Amendment means little if it takes away with one hand what it gives with the
other. The right to speak cannot negate either the right to be silent or to be free
from coerced expression.
Second, the "fact" that the marketing orders did not compel "any actual or
symbolic speech" is in reality a legal conclusion that, again, can only be based
on the commercial nature of the speech.277 Cases such as Buckley v. Valeo278 and
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti2 79 have established that in the political
context, limiting advertising expenditures limits speech. Both logic and
Supreme Court precedent indicate that the same result holds true in the
commercial context. The electric utility in Central Hudson28 could not engage
in "actual" speech to promote the use of electricity; rather it paid money to
purchase promotional advertising. Nevertheless, the Court in that case held the
utility's expenditures for advertising constituted commercial speech protected by
the First Amendment.21  Therefore, the idea that paying for commercial
advertising somehow fails to qualify as speech is insupportable and cannot be
used to justify ignoring the Court's compelled speech precedents.
In a related vein, the Court also denied the applicability of its prior forced
speech decisions, because, it said, the marketing orders did not compel political
or ideological speech.282 According to the Court, only compelled speech that
interferes with an individual's "freedom of belief' violates the First
Amendment.283 Again, this reasoning throws into doubt the whole notion of
First Amendment protection for commercial speech. Laws restricting
commercial speech arguably do not result in ideological traumas, yet they are
still viewed as affecting the advertiser's freedom of expression. Furthermore, the
suggestion that speakers must truly disagree with a message to be free from
compelled speech raises serious implications with respect to both commercial
and political speech. What proof would suffice to show that a plaintiff actually
disagreed with a message, if instituting a time-consuming and expensive legal
challenge and pursuing it to the U.S. Supreme Court is not enough? Taken to its
logical extension, this reasoning would allow the Court in Wooley to inquire into
Mr. Maynard's religious practices to determine whether he qualified as a "real"
277. Glicknan v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 2130, 2138 (1997).
278. 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (stating that expenditure limits in federal campaign
financing law created "direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech").
279. 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (describing corporate expenditures for advertising
regarding referendum as "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection").
280. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). For a discussion of Central Hudson, see supra notes 56-66 and accompanying
text.
281. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
282. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 2130, 2138 (1997).
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Jehovah's Witness,2" before acknowledging his right to contest the compelled
ideological speech. Conditioning constitutional rights on genuine opposition to
the speech in question sets a precedent, which, in the past, the Court recognized
as dangerous and refused to do. 85
The democratic character of the marketing orders, which pursuant to the
AMAA had been approved by either two-thirds of the individual handlers or by
producers who sold at least two-thirds of the fruit by volume,28 may have
influenced the Court's thinking on this point. Perhaps the majority could not
believe the fruit producers were being forced to pay for speech they found
offensive, considering that the advertising campaign was approved by a vote of
those affected. However, because the marketing orders theoretically could have
been approved by one or two dominant producers who accounted for the
requisite volume of production, the regulation may not have been as
participatory as it appeared. 87 As Justice Souter noted in his dissent,288 First
Amendment rights cannot be subject to majority rule. 89
All three of these contextual factors, therefore, boil down to only one: this
case involved compelled commercial speech. According to the Court, compelled
ideological speech and restricted commercial expression constitute "speech" in
the constitutional sense. However, compelled commercial speech does not. The
only reason given by the Court for this distinction is that commercial speech is
not ideological. A more circular and unsatisfactory answer is hard to imagine.
The real, yet still troubling, explanation for the Court's decision may be
found in its emphasis on the collectivization of California's fruit industry in
general and the regulatory nature of the marketing orders in particular. 9 ' The
284. See supra note 275.
285. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635 (1943)
(stating that the right not to be forced to salute the flag does not depend "on one's
possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held").
286. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(9)(B)(i) (1994).
287. See, e.g., Cal-Almond, Inc., v. United States Dep't of Agric., 14 F.3d 429,
438, 438 n.9 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) (recognizing that where
under similar marketing orders, one almond producer dominated the retail market with
a 92 % market share of almonds sold in grocery stores).
288. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130,2152 n.11 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "the mere vote of a majority is never enough to
compel dissenters to pay for private or quasi-private speech whose message they do not
wish to foster, otherwise, the First Amendment would place no limitation on this type of
majoritarian action").
289. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (explaining that the
First Amendment "protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from
the majority"); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)
(stating that the First Amendment protects the "freedom to differ" and prevents
"[c]ompulsory unification of opinion").
290. Gliclanan, 117 S. Ct. at 2138 (reasoning that the plaintiffs were assessed for
advertising "as part of a broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to act
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Court clearly equated the constitutionality of the generic advertising program
with the validity of the entire statutory scheme, stating its fear that "[s]imilar
criticisms might be directed at other features of the regulatory orders that impose
restraints on competition that arguably disadvantage particular producers for the
benefit of the entire market." '291 Rather than separate those aspects of the statute
that affected speech interests (such as the marketing orders) from those that
regulated commercial activities, the Court treated both the former and the latter
as economic regulation.
Significantly, Justice Stevens advocated treating compelled commercial
speech as outside the First Amendment in a case decided eleven years before
Glickman. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California,292 the Court held a private utility company could not be compelled
to include messages from dissenting ratepayers in its billing envelopes, even
though the "extra space" in the envelopes belonged collectively to all the
ratepayers.293 A plurality of the Courft294 invalidated the utility commission's
order granting compelled access on First Amendment grounds, stating that "the
choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say. 295 While the
plurality analyzed the case as presenting an issue of political speech,2 96 Justice
Stevens in his dissent saw only a question of economic regulation. Analogizing
to commission rules establishing utility-bill format, Justice Stevens argued that
the order granting consumer access to those bills was just another example of the
commission's regulatory authority.2 97 Justice Stevens concluded that as such,
the order was entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.298 "In my view," he
said, "this requirement differs little from regulations applied daily to a variety of
commercial communications that have rarely been challenged-and to my
knowledge never invalidated-on First Amendment grounds." 99
Both Pacific Gas & Electric and Glickman involved compelled speech as
part of an otherwise valid, statutory scheme designed to regulate an underlying
business. Like collectivized fruit growers, electric utilities are highly regulated
and have exchanged much of their independence in return for a monopoly. The
manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages is also a heavily regulated industry.
independently is already constrained by the regulatory scheme").
291. Id. at2140.
292. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
293. Id. at 20.
294. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the case. Id. at 21.
295. Id. at 16.
296. The utility had used the billing envelope to distribute its own newsletter,
which contained political editorials as well as billing information. Id. at 5. The Court
described the newsletters' contents as extending "well beyond speech that proposes a
business transaction." Id. at 9.
297. Id. at 36-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 37.
299. Id. at 36.
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However, the Court in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.3" did not treat the federal
labeling restriction at issue as economic regulation, but rather, as a limitation on
protected speech.3"'
The notion that expression can be controlled without constitutional inquiry
whenever the regulation is part of a valid economic program simply denies the
special nature of speech that is guaranteed in our society by the First
Amendment.30 2 This view resurrects Chrestensen's economic approach with
respect to commercial speech that was supposedly left for dead more than twenty
years ago. °3 Perhaps even more ominously, Justice Stevens' dissent in Pacific
Gas & Electric illustrates how a contextual approach can strip constitutional
protection from political as well as commercial speech by characterizing
government attempts to compel expression as mere economic regulation.
To summarize, the Court in Glickman held that fruit producers had no First
Amendment grounds to challenge federal marketing orders compelling them to
finance a generic advertising campaign. The Court relied on several contextual
factors in describing the marketing orders as valid, economic regulation entitled
to no more than rational basis review.3" Upon analysis, these factors do not
justify its conclusion or the resulting distortion of First Amendment principles.
Most disturbing is the Court's implication that commercial speech regulations
fall outside of First Amendment prohibition whenever they are part of an
overarching statutory framework to control underlying economic activities. 0 5
By failing to separate constitutionally protected speech interests from regulable
business operations, the Court's analysis poses a potential danger to political as
well as commercial expression. This Article argues, in accord with Justice
Thomas' position,316 that the marketing orders should have been granted full
First Amendment review (as opposed to the less-than-strict Central Hudson
scrutiny advocated by the other dissenters)3 7 because the advertising campaign
was not designed to prevent commercial harms. One question remains: should
fraudulent or misleading commercial speech remain totally unprotected by the
First Amendment? 308 If so, laws that regulate such speech need not be subject
300. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
301. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
302. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros, & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2156 n.3
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that while the "Government has a considerable
range of authority in regulating the Nation's economic structure, part of the
Constitution-the First Amendment-does enact a distinctly individualistic notion of
'the freedom of speech' and Congress may not simply collectivize that aspect of our
society, regardless of what it may do elsewhere").
303. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
304. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2132.
305. Id. at 2138.
306. Id. at 2155 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 2149 (Souter, J., dissenting).
308. According to the Court in Central Hudson, inaccurate or misleading
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to any First Amendment review. Part V of this Article takes the position that
laws restricting or compelling commercial speech in the name of consumer
protection should be entitled to an intermediate level of First Amendment
scrutiny.
V. TAKING THE NEXT STEP: ANOTHER CHANCE FOR
CENTRAL HUDSON
The most recent development in the commercial speech saga involves the
Court's return to the Virginia Pharmacy point of view that truthful, nondeceptive
commercial speech about legal products or services is entitled to full First
Amendment protection?' Some of the Justices (including Justice Stevens) have
been willing to announce this principle outright.31° Others, however, would
achieve this same end based on a newly tightened interpretation of the Central
Hudson test.311 Regardless of the approach, regulations that restrict accurate,
nonmisleading commercial speech will be subject to what, in essence, constitutes
strict scrutiny review.
The important question, becomes why truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech regarding lawful commodities is entitled to full First Amendment
protection when inaccurate, misleading commercial speech has not been so
embraced by the Court 312 The answer is that accurate, nondeceptive commercial
commercial speech falls outside the scope of First Amendment coverage. Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980).
309. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
310. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507 (1996)
(Stevens, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., plurality opinion); id. at 1516 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). For a discussion of Liquormart, see
supra notes 114-36 and accompanying text.
311. Id. at 1521-22 (O'Connor, Breyer & Souter, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in judgment). See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
312. Some commentators have argued that all commercial speech, misleading or
not, should receive full First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner
Who's Afraid, supra note 42, at 628 (stating that the "commercial/noncommercial
distinction makes no sense"); Redish, supra note 10, at 583 (concluding that no basis
exists to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech for constitutional
purposes). But see R. George Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy
Commercial Speech, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 137, 137 (1994) (arguing that constitutional
protection of commercial speech should be excluded entirely from First Amendment
protection "to promote freedom and well-being in the long term").
However, none of the Justices have suggested enlarging constitutional protection
for commercial speech quite so far. Even Justice Thomas in his Liquormart concurrence
stated only that the Central Hudson test should not be applied where "the government's
asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to
manipulate their choices in the marketplace." Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). He reserved the question of whether a
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speech does not pose a danger to consumers. More precisely, it cannot defraud,
deceive, or otherwise expose them to marketplace harms.
Based on this reasoning, the "preservation of a fair bargaining process"' 13
must be acknowledged as the sole valid justification for government regulation
of commercial speech.3 14 The Court's words in Virginia Pharmacy bear
repeating: "The First Amendment... does not prohibit the State from insuring
that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely." '315
This section of the Article argues, however, that even government attempts to
restrict or compel commercial speech in the name of consumer protection
infringe on free expression and therefore should be subject to First Amendment
review. To determine the constitutionality of regulations that compel speech for
the purpose of preventing commercial harms, this Article concludes that a
modified Central Hudson test is the proper approach.
A. The More Principled Approach: Restrict or Compel Commercial
Speech Only to Prevent Commercial Harms
Once protecting consumers from fraud in the marketplace is identified as
the foundation for commercial speech regulation, it then becomes clear that laws
which attempt to limit commercial speech for some other purpose-for example,
to beautify city streets by removing commercial newsracks316 or to discourage
consumers from using electricity when the state wants to conserve
energy317-- can be valid only if they withstand full First Amendment scrutiny.
Furthermore, the risk that any state interest can be phrased in terms of consumer
protection is reduced by automatically granting truthful commercial information
full First Amendment protection. For example, a law forbidding brewers from
listing alcohol content on their beer labels318 could not be justified as a way to
protect consumers from the folly of choosing beer based on its alcoholic
strength. The fact that the statute prohibited the dissemination of accurate,
nonmisleading commercial information would show that the state had attempted
to protect consumers in an unacceptably paternalistic way. The Court in Rubin
Central Hudson-type balancing test might be appropriate "when the asserted state interest
is of a different kind." Id. at 523 n.5.
313. Id. at 501 (Stevens, Kennedy, & Ginsburg, JJ., plurality opinion).
314. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
315. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976).
316. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993),
discussed supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
317. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), discussed supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
318. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), discussed supra notes
101-10 and accompanying text.
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v. Coors Brewing Co.,319 also invalidated such a labeling restriction on much less
satisfying grounds, and only after approving the same manipulative state interest
pursuant to the Central Hudson test.32
Surprisingly, given his treatment of compelled commercial speech in
Glickman, Justice Stevens in his Rubin concurrence recognized consumer
protection as providing the only acceptable rationale for the State to regulate
commercial speech.32' Justice Stevens said the beer labeling law in that case was
entitled to full First Amendment scrutiny because it "neither prevents misleading
speech nor protects consumers from the dangers of incomplete information."32
Justice Stevens emphasized that "any description of commercial speech that is
intended to identify the category of speech entitled to less First Amendment
protection should relate to the reasons for permitting broader regulation:
namely, commercial speech's potential to mislead.'"3" Contrary to his position
in Glickman, Justice Stevens indicated that this analysis should be used to
evaluate government attempts to compel and restrict commercial speech. Justice
Stevens contended that a law requiring brewers to disclose alcohol content on
their beer labels would be subject to less-than-strict First Amendment scrutiny
because such a law "could be justified as a means to ensure that consumers are
not led, by incomplete or inaccurate information, to purchase products they
would not purchase if they knew the truth about them. '324 Similarly, it follows
that a law requiring brewers to list net profits on their labels would be subject to
strict scrutiny review because such a law would not protect consumers from
marketplace harms any more than did Glickman's compelled advertising
program. Justice Stevens and the Court ducked this analysis in Glickman by
reaching the insupportable conclusion that the generic advertising campaign did
not rise to the level of speech at all.
325
Justice Stevens' reasoning in Rubin discredits not only the result in
Glickman, but also his own analogy in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California.326 In that case, Justice Stevens' dissent
analogized a utility commission's order forcing a utility to include missives from
disgruntled ratepayers in its billing envelopes to commission rules prescribing
"required warnings and the type size of various provisos and disclaimers.
327
319. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
320. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
321. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
322. Id. at 492.
323. Id. at 494.
324. Id. at 493.
325. See supra notes 221-52 and accompanying text.
326. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
327. Id. at 37-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also compared the utility
commission's order to the Securities and Exchange Commission requirement that
incumbent boards of directors include dissident shareholder proposals with their proxy
materials. Id. at 39. As the plurality opinion noted, however, this SEC requirement is
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According to Justice Stevens, both examples constituted a valid exercise of the
commission's power to regulate the commercial aspects of the utility's
328operations. 8 If the Court invalidated the former example, Justice Stevens
argued, it should also disapprove of the latter.329
Even assuming, as did Justice Stevens, that the bill insert order did not
involve political speech, a clear constitutional distinction exists between these
two types of regulation. Rules that fix utility bill format, it can safely be
assumed, advance the state interest in making sure that consumers can read their
bills.330 Similarly, regulations establishing various warnings and provisos on
utility bills also provide consumers with necessary information to prevent
commercial harms. However, while the order that the utility provide a forum for
discontented ratepayers may have indirectly promoted more effective utility
regulation by advancing diverse viewpoints, 33' it clearly was not designed to
protect consumers. Therefore, whether the utility's newsletter constituted
commercial or political speech-a distinction that can be hard to draw 32 -was
irrelevant. The order in Pacific Gas & Electric was entitled to strict scrutiny
distinguishable as a rule of internal corporate governance. Id. at 14 n.10.
328. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 38-39.
330. For example, in certain Texas counties, portions of utility bills must be printed
in both English and Spanish. See 16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE ANN § 23.6 (West 1997).
331. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986).
The plurality noted, however, that more effectual rate-making proceedings could be
achieved in ways that would not infringe on the utility's speech, and that the First
Amendment does not allow the state to "advance some points of view by burdening the
expression of others." Id.
332. The Court in Virginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), recognized that commercial speech has political
overtones, saying that although commercial speech furthers "the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered." Id. at 765.
The Court also indicated how these political overtones make commercial and political
speech practically indistinguishable:
[We may assume that the advertiser's interest is a purely economic one. That
hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment. The interests
of the contestants in a labor dispute are primarily economic, but it has long been
settled that both the employee and the employer are protected by the First
Amendment when they express, themselves on the merits of the dispute in order to
influence its outcome.
Since the fate of... a "single factory" could as well turn on its ability to
advertise its product as on the resolution of its labor difficulties, we see no
satisfactory distinction between the two kinds of speech.
Id. at 763-63 (citations omitted).
Commentators have also noted how today's political advertising is really closer in
content to product packaging. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low- Value
Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 344 (1995).
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review because, unlike commercial disclosure requirements that prescribe utility
bill format, it did not advance the state's interest in consumer protection.
B. Searching for a Constitutional Test: Are Laws That Regulate
Deceptive Speech Subject to First Amendment Review?
Given that consumer protection provides the basis for treating commercial
speech-whether restricted or compelled-with less than full First Amendment
protection, it should not be assumed that laws affecting commercial speech in the
name of consumer protection are automatically constitutional. Of course, the
Central Hudson test literally does make that assumption. According to that test,
inaccurate or misleading commercial speech falls outside the First
Amendment,333 creating what has been described as "a mini-species of
unprotected speech. '334 It has been argued that if laws regulating deceptive
speech are made subject to constitutional scrutiny beyond the requirements of
due process, it will mean the death knell for state and federal consumer
protection regulation.335 Others contend that these fears are unfounded, and that
the government would retain the ability to fight fraud even if full First
Amendment protection were awarded to commercial speech.336
Laws that regulate or compel commercial speech for consumer protection
purposes should be reviewed pursuant to an intermediate level of First
Amendment scrutiny. These regulations still infringe on speech interests and,
as such, should be presumed to raise First Amendment concerns. Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg seemed to say as much in Liquormart, where
they endorsed a "less than strict" Central Hudson analysis to determine the
constitutionality of laws regulating "misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices" or requiring "the disclosure of beneficial consumer information.'
337
An analogy can be drawn to libel law, where the First Amendment provides
333. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564-65 (1980). Under this test, ads for illegal products or activities are also not entitled
to First Amendment protection. Id. Although the issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, see Sullivan, supra note 10, at 149-52, for a discussion regarding the
implications of including ads for illegal transactions within the First Amendment's
purview.
334. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 152.
335. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 81, at 1194-96 (contending that almost all of
our laws against product misrepresentation would be unconstitutional if full First
Amendment scrutiny was awarded to commercial speech); Sullivan, supra note 10, at
155 (stating that applying even limited First Amendment review to regulations
prohibiting potentially misleading speech would make consumer protection laws harder
to defend).
336. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid, supra note 42, at 651-52.
337. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens,
Kennedy, Ginsburg, JJ., plurality opinion). See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 146.
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certain safeguards for defendants charged with publishing defamatory
statements, despite the false nature of their speech.338 Like misleading
commercial speech, defamation is untrue, yet libel law recognizes it as
expression that implicates the First Amendment. So should the commercial
speech doctrine recognize that laws restricting or compelling speech in the name
of consumer protection interfere with protected speech, and therefore, should be
subject to some measure of First Amendment review. The intermediate scrutiny
provided by a Central Hudson-type test would recognize both the importance of
preserving a fair bargaining process and protecting speech. Similarly, libel law
represents a compromise between reputational interests and freedom of
expression.
The Court has in fact treated laws designed to regulate deceptive advertising
with an intermediate scrutiny similar to the Central Hudson test, at least with
respect to potentially misleading, as opposed to actually misleading, commercial
speech. While the Court has held that speech need not be actually fraudulent to
be regulable,339 it has also said that "states may not place an absolute prohibition
on certain types of potentially misleading information."34  Several times, the
Court has emphasized that the state cannot be allowed to run roughshod over
commercial speech just by announcing that it is eliminating fraud. For example,
in Edenfield v. Fane,34' the Court invalidated a state rule forbidding certified
public accountants from personally soliciting clients. Although the State argued
that the rule was justified to protect consumers from deceptive or overreaching
practices,"' the Court looked skeptically at the government's claim. While
agreeing that the State had averred a substantial interest, the Court faulted the
State for failing to provide empirical evidence to support that interest.
343
Similarly, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois,34 the Court invalidated a state rule forbidding attorneys to list trial
certifications on their letterheads.345 Again, the State argued that the rule was
justified by the potentially misleading nature of the speech. 46 Although the
plurality did not say it was applying the Central Hudson test, it found that the
338. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(holding that the First Amendment does not allow public officials to recover for libel
without proving that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of the truth).
339. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (holding that the government
can regulate commercial speech that has a "significant possibility" of misleading the
public).
340. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
341. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
342. Id. at 768.
343. Id. at 770-71.
344. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
345. Id. at 111.
346. Id. at 106.
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State had not met its "heavy burden" to justify the prohibition,347 and suggested
that the State should have considered less restrictive alternatives.34
Furthermore, even when it upheld a disclosure requirement based on the need to
prevent consumer deception, the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel349 noted such disclosures could not be unduly burdensome. These
examples show the Court giving more scrutiny to consumer protection laws than
would be required under a deferential, rational basis approach.35'
Lower courts, have also applied a Central Hudson analysis even when the
restriction on commercial speech is said to protect consumers. In Ficker v.
Curran,5 2 the Fourth Circuit invalidated a state requirement that attorneys
refrain from sending direct-mail solicitations for thirty days to persons charged
with traffic or criminal offenses.33 Although the court acknowledged the State's
interest in "shielding recipients from undue influence or confusion,"354 it held
that the thirty-day ban did not materially advance that interest,3 55 nor was it
narrowly drawn,356 thereby failing Central Hudson's third and fourth prongs.
However, if laws meant to prevent commercial overreaching need not be subject
to more than rational basis review, the court's application of the Central Hudson
test was a meaningless exercise, and its holding subject to question. To avoid
this confusion, the Court should acknowledge that laws affecting commercial
speech in the name of consumer protection will be reviewed pursuant to a
Central Hudson-type approach.
C. Focusing on Compelled Commercial Speech: How Will the Test
Work?
A theory is only as good as its application. With respect to commercial
disclosure requirements in particular, how would a Central Hudson framework
apply? As discussed above, the only "substantial interest ' 357 that would justify
347. Id. at 109.
348. Id. at 110.
349. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
350. Id. at 651.
351. A notable exception to this conclusion is the now-discredited Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986),
where the Court upheld a restriction on casino advertising to protect citizens from the
harmful effects of gambling on little more than rational basis review. See supra notes 71-
80 and accompanying text.
352. 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1997)
353. Id. at 1151.
354. Id. at 1153.
355. Id. at 1153-54.
356. Id. at 1155.
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state efforts to either limit or compel commercial speech is that of protecting
consumers from fraudulent or misleading35 marketplace practices. Modified this
way and because, by definition, it would not apply to truthful, nondeceptive
speech, the remainder of the Central Hudson test becomes less susceptible to
judicial manipulation of the type epitomized by the Court's decision in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.359 Disclosure
requirements add information to the marketplace and so would often appear to
advance the state's interest in consumer protection. Even so, to be subject to less
than full First Amendment review, the state should be required to show that the
compelled commercial disclosures alleviate a real danger of deception, and that
a nexus exists between the proposed disclosure requirement and that danger.
Finally, disclosure requirements may often be less restrictive than speech
prohibitions or restrictions: they must not be "more extensive than necessary"3'
to achieve the state interest in preventing marketplace overreaching.
In Tillman v. Miller,"' a recent case involving attorney advertising, the
Eleventh Circuit applied such an analysis to properly overturn an unjustified and
overly burdensome disclosure requirement. In that case, a state law provided
that attorneys who advertised their workers' compensation services on television
must include in those advertisements a video notice.362 The notice was to remain
on the screen for at least five seconds, and read as follows: "Willfully making
a false or misleading statement or representation to obtain or deny workers'
compensation benefits is a crime carrying a penalty of imprisonment and/or a
fine of up to $10,000.00.,,363
Although the court said it would review the disclosure requirement pursuant
to the less stringent standards announced in Zauderer,3' the court's reasoning
was in fact quite comparable to the Central Hudson test.365 First, the court held
that the State had not justified its interest in assuring that solicitations regarding
workers' compensation claims contained "truthfil and adequate disclosure of all
material and relevant information ' because the plaintiff's ad was truthful as
it stood.367 Second, the court found that the State had failed to show that its
requirement directly advanced that state interest, because the State had produced
no evidence either (1) that lawyers' ads encouraged citizens to file false workers'
compensation claims, or (2) that the video notice would reduce the number of
358. See infra notes 389-90 and accompanying text.
359. Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 328. See supra notes 71-80 and
accompanying text.
360. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
361. 133 F.3d 1402 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
362. Id. at 1403.
363. Id. at 1403 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-31 (1995)).
364. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
365. Tillman, 133 F.3d at 1403.
366. Id. at 1403 n.2 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-30(b) (1995)).
367. Id. at 1403.
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fraudulent claims filed.368 This meant that no nexus existed between the
plaintiff's advertisement and the evil addressed by the disclosure. As the court
said, "[t]he message... is not tied to an inherent quality of the thing [the
plaintiff] is trying to sell-his legal services. ''369 Finally, the court determined
that the disclosure requirement was overly burdensome because it unfairly
placed the cost of informing the public about the State's criminal law on
television advertisers7° The court noted that five seconds out of a thirty-second
commercial was far from "trifling. ' 37' Accordingly, the disclosure requirement
infringed on First Amendment rights by unjustifiably compelling commercial
speech.37
Under a Central Hudson approach, could a state ever compel a disclosure
in a commercial advertisement if that ad was not inaccurate or deceptive on its
face? Inherent in the notion of "misleading" advertising is the notion that
consumers should have adequate information about a product.373 For example,
a box of cereal would not be deceptive if it did not disclose how many grams of
sugar were inside. However, as a mother, I believe that information is essential
in choosing food for my family. Similarly, even though a recent study has
shown that restricting one's salt intake may actually cause health problems,374 I
still would prefer to know that if I buy certain canned soups, I am paying for
little more than salty water. While not every instance of consumer curiosity
would justify a disclosure requirement, laws requiring manufacturers to reveal
product information that is both relevant and material to a purchasing decision
should satisfy the state interest in preventing commercial harms.
For example, in International Dairy Foods Ass 'n v. Amestoy, 375 the Second
Circuit invalidated a commercial disclosure law by mischaracterizing the State's
interest in consumer protection as "mere consumer concern."376 In that case, a
Vermont law required dairy manufacturers to identify products that came from
cows treated with the synthetic growth hormone recombinant Bovine
Somatotropin ("rBST").377 Using the Central Hudson standard to evaluate the
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1403-04.
371. Id. at 1404 n.4.
372. Id. at 1403.
373. To repeat Justice Stevens' explanation, disclosure requirements can "be
justified as a means to ensure that consumers are not led, by incomplete or inaccurate
information, to purchase products they would not purchase if they knew the truth about
them." Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment).
374. Salt Restriction Could Be Harmful, New Study Finds, HOUSTON CHRON., June
3, 1998, at F2.
375. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
376. Id. at 73.
377. Id. at 69.
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law, the court concluded that the statute failed to advance a substantial state
interest because tests conducted by the Food and Drug Administration showed
no safety or health considerations associated with foods derived from rBST-
treated cows. 378 Based on the government studies, the court concluded that the
information regarding rBST should not be material to consumers. 379 According
to the court, "[w]ere consumer interest alone sufficient [to compel disclosure],
there is no end to the information that states could require manufacturers to
disclose about their production methods., 38
0
The Second Circuit erred, however, in Amestoy by applying an overly
paternalistic understanding of what information is material to a reasonable
consumer. In effect, the court said that because the government says rBST is
safe, consumers do not need to know about it. However, as Judge Leval noted
in his dissenting opinion many consumer products once believed to be
safe-including tobacco-were later found to be dangerous.38 As shown by the
recent fen-phen debacle,382 even FDA approval cannot guarantee ultimate safety
of a product. In Amestoy, evidence produced by the State demonstrated that
consumers were wary of foodstuffs produced by genetic biotechnological
manipulation. 3 As a result, the trial court found that a majority of the State's
citizens "do not want to purchase milk products derived from rBST-treated
cows."
384
Accordingly, the disclosure requirement clearly advanced a substantial state
interest in providing accurate information about a product that reasonable
consumers considered relevant to their purchasing decisions.3 85 Although the
Second Circuit was correct that the government should not be allowed to make
manufacturers disclose anything consumers might want to know, the labeling
law in Amestoy was not based on irrational concerns. Furthermore, unlike the
disclosure requirement in Tillman discussed above,386 the labeling law did not
appear to be onerous or unduly burdensome.3 7
378. Id. at 73.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 74.
381. Id. at 77 (Leval, J., dissenting).
382. The FDA-approved diet drug fen-phen was withdrawn from the market after
some users suffered heart damage. See John Schwartz, Two Diet Drugs Are Pulled Off
Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at Al.
383. International Dairy Farmers Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 75-76 (2d Cir.
1996) (Leval, J., dissenting).
384. Intemtional Dairy Farmers Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246,250 (D. Vt.
1995), rev'd, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
385. For a thorough discussion of the rBST controversy and various state labeling
provisions, see Terence J. Centner & Kyle W. Lathrop, Labeling rBST-Derived Milk
Products: State Responses to Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 511 (1997).
386. See supra notes 364-74 and accompanying text.
387. The law required that milk obtained from rBST-treated cows be identified as
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It is inevitable, however, that what constitutes "misleading" speech under
this analysis will be debatable. With respect to cigarette advertisements, to give
a current example, some commentators have argued that tobacco ads are
inherently misleading because they ignore the substantial dangers of smoking
and instead rely on inaccurate depictions of glamorous lifestyles.388 Others have
countered that cigarette ads cannot be considered misleading because ihey carry
specific warning labels,38 9 or because they convey opinion statements regarding
the pleasures of smoking that are undoubtedly true for some smokers.39" As
foraying into the law of deceptive advertising is beyond the scope of this Article,
suffice it to say that this will continue to be an area for administrative and
judicial interpretation. If one thing is clear, however, it is that such interpretation
must take First Amendment interests into account.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the commercial speech doctrine's development has largely
been charted through Supreme Court decisions written by Justice Stevens.
Writing for the Court in Discovery Networl 9' and the plurality in Liquormart,392
he questioned the constitutional distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech,393 and advocated treating truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech as fully protected by the First Amendment.394 Furthermore,
Justice Stevens correctly identified protecting consumers from commercial
such on the package or by a store shelf label. The statute also required retailers to post
a sign with the following text:
The United States Food and Drug Administration has determined that there
is no significant difference between milk from treated and untreated cows. It
is the law of Vermont that products made from the milk ofrBST-treated cows
be labeled to help consumers make informed shopping decisions.
Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 70 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2754 (Supp. 1996)).
For a very different analysis of Amestoy, see Sweetland, supra note 21, at 479-83
(concluding that disclosure requirements in general should not be accorded First
Amendment protection).
388. See Vincent Blasi & Henry P. Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette
Advertising, 250 J. A.M.A. 502, 506 (1986); Lowenstein, supra note 143, at 1222-24;
Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment
Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 99, 113-14 (1988).
389. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81
IOWA L. REv. 589, 609 (1996).
390. See Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
1147, 1207-09 (1996).
391. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
392. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
393. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419-23.
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harms as the underlying rationale behind state regulation of commercial
speech.395 By so doing, h6 provided the Court with a badly needed theoretical
basis for why commercial speech may be regulated in the first place. All in all,
Justice Stevens may be described as a great champion of commercial speech
when it comes to state attempts to restrict advertising messages.
It is ironic, then, that Justice Stevens also drafted the Court's troubling
decision in Glickman,396 in which compelled commercial speech was treated as
wholly outside the First Amendment.397 While underlying facts will always be
important in deciding legal controversies, the Court's contextual approach in
Glickman makes the unpredictable Central Hudson398 ad hoc balancing test look
like a model of conscientious decision-making. More importantly, the Court in
Glickman failed to separate aspects of the statutory scheme that affected speech
from those that affected commerce. Instead, the Court treated both as mere
economic regulation entitled only to substantive due process review. Reading
the First Amendment out of a law that compels speech because that law is part
of a larger, regulatory framework is unprincipled at best and dangerous at worst.
The government can regulate expression in two ways: it can restrict speech
and it can compel speech. Either way, First Amendment interests are at stake.
Speech that is valuable enough to be protected should retain that protection
regardless of the form of regulation employed by the government. If commercial
speech can be restricted only in the name of preserving a fair bargaining
process-a stance that this Article wholeheartedly supports-then, conversely,
commercial speech can be compelled only for the same purpose. As the
mandatory advertising program in Glickman was not intended to protect
consumers from commercial harms, it should have been invalidated pursuant to
strict scrutiny review. While strengthening and stabilizing commodities markets
may be a laudable goal, the state should not be allowed to achieve it by forcing
farmers to pay for advertisements against their will.
Commercial disclosure requirements are often essential to ensure that
consumers have access to sufficient accurate information to make informed
marketplace decisions. The immense state and federal administrative machinery
dedicated to eradicating deceptive trade practices evidences our policy choice to
favor consumer protection. Yet even here, the First Amendment cannot allow
the state free rein to compel speech whenever it asserts the public could
potentially be misled. In a modified form, 399 Central Hudson can have a useful
second life as the appropriate test for determining the constitutionality of laws
that restrict or compel commercial speech in the name of consumer protection.
395. Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. at 426.
396. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
397. Id. at2142.
398. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 359-63 and accompanying text.
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According to his opinion in Liquormart, as to this point, even Justice Stevens
would agree.4
400. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens,
Kennedy, & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text
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